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       a. The Definition of "wrongful". 
 
In Enmons, the Court faced the question whether the use 
of violence in a labor strike to obtain higher wages and 
other benefits was extortion within the meaning of the 
Hobbs Act. The Court reviewed the wording of the Act and 
its legislative history and determined that such conduct 
was not extortion. In reaching its decision, the Court 
interpreted the word wrongful, which is not defined in the 
Act, as follows: 
 
       The term "wrongful," which on the face of the statute 
       modifies the use of each of the enumerated means of 
       obtaining property -- actual or threatened force, 
       violence, or fear -- would be superfluous if it only 
       served to describe the means used. For it would be 
       redundant to speak of "wrongful violence" or "wrongful 
       force" since, as the government acknowledges, any 
       violence or force to obtain property is "wrongful." 
       Rather, "wrongful" has meaning in the Act only if it 
       limits the statute's coverage to those instances where 
       the obtaining of the property would itself be "wrongful" 
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       because the alleged extortionist has no lawful claim to 
       that property. 
 
Id. at 399-400 (emphasis added). 
 
The ability to defend against an extortion charge based 
on a lawful claim to the property obtained has been dubbed 
the "claim of right" defense to extortion. See United States 
v. Agnes, 753 F.2d 293, 298 (3d Cir. 1985). Since Enmons 
dealt with the use of force to obtain property, and 
concluded that it was not extortion, read broadly, Enmons 
could stand for the principle that in all extortion cases, 
even "inherently" wrongful actions such as the use or 
threatened use of force or violence, do not constitute 
extortion where the defendant has a lawful claim to the 
property obtained. This broad application of Enmons, i.e., 
outside of the labor context, has, however, been uniformly 
rejected by the courts of appeals out of a fear that it would 
"effectively repeal the Hobbs Act." See United States v. 
Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415, 419 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 
The effort to limit the potential impact of Enmons has led 
to a line of cases wherein this Court and others have 
refused to extend the claim of right defense to defendants 
accused of using actual or threatened force or violence to 
obtain property outside of the labor context. For example, 
in United States v. Agnes, supra, the defendant was 
convicted of extortion for using threats of force and actual 
violence in seeking property which was arguably his under 
state law. On appeal, he argued that the district court erred 
in refusing to allow him to assert a claim of right defense 
and in failing to properly instruct the jury that it is not 
wrongful to obtain property to which one has a legal right. 
See 753 F.2d at 297. We noted that defendant's contentions 
were predicated on Enmons and held that, contrary to 
defendant's suggestion, Enmons did not create a general 
claim of right defense in all cases involving the threatened 
or actual use of force or violence. Instead we interpreted 
Enmons to "create a claim of right defense only in . . . 
situations [such as those present in Enmons] in which the 
use of force is expressly identified by Congress as being 
outside the purview of the Hobbs Act." Id. at 299 (emphasis 
added). Other cases, noted in the margin, have similarly 
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limited the reach of the claim of right defense in cases 
involving the threatened or actual use of force or violence.21 
 
The present case does not fall within this line of cases 
limiting Enmons since it solely involves the accusation of 
the wrongful use of the fear of economic loss. Unlike the 
use or threatened use of force or violence, the use of 
economic fear in business negotiations between private 
parties is not "inherently" wrongful. See Sturm, 870 F.2d at 
773 (citation omitted); United States v. Clemente, 640 F.2d 
at 1077; Hall Am. Ctr. Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. Dick, 726 
F. Supp. 1083, 1095 (E.D. Mich. 1989). Indeed, the fear of 
economic loss is a driving force of our economy that plays 
an important role in many legitimate business transactions. 
This economic reality leads us to conclude that the reach of 
the Hobbs Act is limited in cases, such as this one, which 
involve the use of economic fear in a transaction between 
two private parties. The limitation we apply is that set forth 
in Enmons: that a defendant is not guilty of extortion if he 
has a lawful claim to the property obtained. 
 
We find support for our conclusion in the law of other 
circuits. The Second Circuit recognized the issues and 
concerns affecting this case in United States v. Capo, 791 
F.2d 1054, 1062 (2d Cir. 1986), vacated in part, on other 




21. See United States v. Zappola, 677 F.2d 264, 269, 70 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(Enmons inapplicable where businessmen beat and threatened victim to 
coerce payment of alleged debt); United States v. Porcaro, 648 F.2d 753, 
759-60 (1st. Cir. 1981) (claim of right to property irrelevant where force 
or threats are used in resolution of contractual dispute); United States 
v. 
Kattar, 840 F.2d 118, 123 n.2 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Except in certain labor 
contexts . . . using threats of violence to induce the payment of money 
is unlawful, regardless of the extortionist's possible legal right to the 
funds at issue."); United States v. Sturm, 870 F.2d 769, 772-73 (1st Cir. 
1989) (defendants "claim of right" to property obtained from victim is 
proper defense outside of labor context only if defendant did not use 
"inherently wrongful" means such as force or violence to obtain the 
property); United States v. Warledo, 557 F.2d 721, 729-30 (10th Cir. 
1977) (Enmons inapplicable to Indian tribe's threats and violence to 
pursue allegedly valid claim against railroad); United States v. Cohen, 
738 F.2d 287, 289 (8th Cir. 1984). 
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       We recognize, of course, that fear of economic loss 
       plays a role in many business transactions that are 
       entirely legitimate; awareness of that fear and use of it 
       as leverage in bargaining, in which each side offers the 
       other property, services, or rights it legitimately owns 
       or controls, is not made unlawful by the Hobbs Act. 
       What the Act reaches is not mere hard bargaining but 
       the exploitation of the fear of economic loss in order to 
       obtain property to which the exploiter is not entitled. 
 
       (emphasis added). 
 
See also United States v. Clemente, 640 F.2d at 1076-78 
(use of fear of economic loss is wrongful when employed to 
achieve the wrongful purpose of obtaining property to 
which one is not entitled). 
 
The First Circuit has explicitly extended the claim of right 
defense to cases involving solely the fear of economic harm. 
See Sturm, 870 F.2d at 773 ("[F]or purposes of the Hobbs 
Act, the use of legitimate economic threats to obtain 
property is wrongful only if the defendant has no claim of 
right to that property."). The position of the First and 
Second Circuits is mirrored in the federal pattern jury 
instructions for the Hobbs Act. In those instructions 
"wrongful" is defined as "mean[ing] that the defendant had 
no lawful claim or right to the money or the property 
(he)(she) sought or attempted to obtain", and district courts 
are directed that this definition "should be given only in 
cases involving a fear of economic loss or in trials 
concerning the use of violence by union leadership to 
secure higher wages for the membership as opposed to 
securing money for themselves." E. Devitt et al., Federal 
Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal, S 45.08 & notes 
(4th ed. 1990). We believe that the position of the First and 
Second Circuits is sensible, and adopt it here. 
 
       b. Lawful Versus Unlawful Claims to Property  
 
Our conclusion that the defendants are not guilty of 
extortion if they had a lawful claim to the property obtained 
from Gary's, while focusing our inquiry, does not resolve 
the issue before us since the line separating lawful from 
unlawful claims to property obtained in business 
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negotiations is by no means self evident. Once again, we 
start with Enmons which, although addressing extortion 
through force or violence, provides direction as to the 
distinction between lawful and unlawful claims to property. 
 
The Court in Enmons, having held that a Hobbs Act 
conviction could not be predicated on violence related to 
union activity that was aimed at obtaining property to 
which the alleged extortionist had a lawful claim, found 
that the defendants, union members and officials, had a 
lawful claim to the property -- in the form of wages and 
other employment benefits -- that they obtained from the 
employer. The Court found that where violence is employed 
"to achieve legitimate union objectives, such as higher 
wages, in return for genuine services which the employer 
seeks . . . there has been no `wrongful' taking of the 
employer's property; he has paid for the services bargained 
for, and the workers receive the wages to which they are 
entitled in compensation for their services." 410 U.S. at 
400. This scenario was distinguished from cases where 
"union officials threatened force or violence against an 
employer in order to obtain personal payoffs, and where 
unions used the proscribed means to exact `wage' payments 
in return for `imposed, unwanted, superfluous and fictitious 
services' of workers." Id. In such cases, the union officials 
would not have a lawful claim to the property obtained, and 
thus the conduct would fall within the reach of the Hobbs 
Act. 
 
We find particularly illuminating the application of 
Enmons' basic teaching by the District Court for the 
Southern District of New York in Viacom Int'l v. Icahn, 747 
F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd on other grounds, 946 
F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1991), a case involving the allegation of 
extortion through the wrongful use of the fear of economic 
loss. In Viacom, the defendants were accused of purchasing 
substantial stock in the plaintiff company (Viacom) and 
then coercing the plaintiff to buy its stock back for cash, 
stock warrants, and free advertising -- all allegedly under 
a threat of a corporate takeover. In return for the requested 
"greenmail," the defendants agreed not to buy the plaintiff's 
stock (or otherwise seek control of the plaintiff) for a period 
of eleven years. See id. at 207-09. Following this 
 
                                52 
  
transaction, the plaintiff brought a civil RICO suit alleging, 
inter alia, that defendants had violated the Hobbs Act by 
obtaining above-market consideration for their shares from 
plaintiff with plaintiff's consent, with such consent induced 
through the wrongful use of economic fear. See id. at 210. 
On defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court 
dismissed as a matter of law the allegation that the 
challenged practice constituted extortion. See id. at 213. 
 
The court recognized that it was faced with a case in 
which the alleged extortion victim received something of 
value -- an eleven-year standstill covenant, 3,498,200 
shares of common stock, and, thereby, relief from the 
threat of a corporate takeover. It then surveyed existing 
case law in which the victim received something of value in 
exchange for his property, and found that in these 
circumstances "some acts constitute extortion and others 
are found to be `hard bargaining.' " Id. at 212-13. The court 
drew the following distinction between the two: 
 
       In a "hard bargaining" scenario the alleged victim has 
       no pre-existing right to pursue his business interests 
       free of the fear he is quelling by receiving value in 
       return for transferring property to the defendant, but 
       in an extortion scenario the alleged victim has a pre- 
       existing entitlement to pursue his business interests 
       free of the fear he is quelling by receiving value in 
       return for transferring property to the defendant. 
 
Id. at 213. 
 
Applying this framework, the court used as examples of 
extortion, the "personal payoff cases" addressed in Enmons. 
In those cases the defendants "had no lawful claim to the 
property they received from the victims in exchange for 
providing the victims with influence and goodwill which 
quelled the victims fears of harm to their economic 
interests." Id. While the victim received something of value 
in return for this payment, "the victim [was] entitled by law 
to be free of the fear he [was] quelling by giving property to 
the defendant . . . [and thus] the `something of value' the 
victim receive[d] [was], as a matter of law, as `imposed, 
unwanted, superfluous and fictitious' as the hiring of a 
second worker to do the job that another worker is already 
doing." Id. (citations omitted). 
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The court then focused on those cases in which the 
victim receives something of value yet the conduct is found 
to be hard bargaining. It drew examples of this conduct 
from the Second Circuit's opinion in United States v. Capo, 
791 F.2d at 1062-63, which stated that: 
 
       [a]lthough a job applicant who has long been out of 
       work may have a fear of not obtaining employment that 
       would constitute a fear of economic loss within the 
       meaning of the Act, the Act would not ordinarily reach, 
       for example, the efforts of a prospective employer to 
       bargain down the level of compensation to be paid the 
       applicant. Nor would it reach the normal activities of 
       an employment agency in dealing with the applicant 
       even if, for example the agency required payment from 
       its applicants of some sort of filing fee, service charge, 
       or contingent fee. 
 
In these cases, the defendant is legally entitled to the 
property obtained from the victim since he has provided 
real value in exchange for that property, and the victim has 
no preexisting right to be free of the fear he is quelling in 
return for his payment to the defendant. 
 
A further example of hard bargaining was provided by the 
facts of Viacom itself. Since the plaintiff had received 
something of value in return for the property transferred to 
the defendants, the court looked to whether the law entitled 
"Viacom to a right to pursue its business interests free of 
the problems and fears caused by the threat of a takeover 
by defendants." 747 F. Supp. at 213. The court found that 
the law granted no such entitlement and thus that 
 
       any intentional exploitation of fear by defendants was 
       only part of "hard bargaining" in a deal which resulted 
       in plaintiff receiving a benefit to which it was not 
       otherwise entitled by law. Accordingly, defendants did 
       not obtain property from plaintiff to which they had no 
       lawful claim and therefore did not commit extortion. 
 
Id. at 213-14. 
 
In the present case, the property that U.S. Healthcare 
obtained from Gary's was the payments made by Gary's to 
CHA pursuant to its TPA contract. In return for this 
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property, U.S. Healthcare gave Gary's access to its provider 
network -- something that is of considerable value to 
Gary's. Thus, like the court in Viacom, we deal with a very 
narrow subset of the potential universe of extortion cases: 
one involving solely the accusation of the wrongful use of 
economic fear where two private parties have engaged in a 
mutually beneficial exchange of property. While we believe 
that the fact-bound nature of this type of case will not 
supply a generalized precept, we are convinced by the logic 
of Viacom that BCI's extortion claim can only survive if 
Gary's had a right to pursue its business interests free of 
the fear that it would be excluded from the provider 
network. Albeit with misgivings, we find that it had no such 
right. 
 
The chief obstacle to BCI's claim is the fact that 
Pennsylvania, unlike many other states, has not adopted 
an "Any Willing Provider" law which compels HMOs to allow 
all interested and minimally qualified providers into their 
networks. If such a law were in force, then Gary's would 
have had a legal entitlement to be a member of the provider 
network and thus to be free of the fear that it would be 
excluded from that network if it did not switch TPA  
providers.22 However, in the absence of such a law, Gary's 
has no right of access to the U.S. Healthcare network and 
thus U.S. Healthcare could have denied Gary's access to its 
network for any reason, or for no reason at all. Under these 
conditions, U.S. Healthcare had the right to exchange the 
valuable consideration of inclusion in its network in return 
for consideration from Gary's in the form of its TPA 
contract. We thus conclude that this case provides an 
example of hard bargaining rather than extortion.23 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. Indeed, if Pennsylvania had such a law not only might the outcome 
of this suit, at least as it pertains to the RICO counts, be different, 
but 
it is likely that the underlying facts would never have occurred. Those 
facts, which demonstrate how heavy-handed tactics can be effectively 
applied by a large corporation (U.S. Healthcare) against a small firm 
(Gary's) in this context, might suggest to the Pennsylvania General 
Assembly that it is time to enact an Any Willing Provider law in 
Pennsylvania. 
 
23. This is also not a case where U.S. Healthcare exerted monopoly 
power in the market for pharmaceutical customers. Under such 
circumstances, the antitrust laws might well confer on Gary's the legal 
right to be free of the economic coercion arising from U.S. Healthcare's 
monopoly. However, we are not presented with such a case and thus do 
not opine on the potential success of such a theory. 
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BCI raises several arguments in opposition to this 
conclusion. First, BCI submits that even if Gary's had no 
right to membership in the provider network per se, it did 
have a right to compete for membership in that network 
free from coercion. BCI attempts to ground this right in our 
holding in Addonizio, supra. In that case, we considered 
extortion charges based on public corruption in which 
government officials demanded kickbacks from contractors, 
suppliers and engineers engaged in public works projects 
for the city of Newark, New Jersey. In upholding 
defendants' extortion convictions, we determined that, while 
the contractors have no right to obtain a contract with the 
city, they "have a right to expect that when they incur time 
and expense to bid on public projects, they will be awarded 
contracts when their bids are lowest . . . . The City of 
Newark had systematically destroyed this right." 451 F.2d 
at 73 (emphasis added). 
 
Our holding in Addonizio is distinguishable since it is 
based on the right of private citizens to compete for 
government contracts on a level playing field. Such a right 
is solidly embedded in public policy. See also United States 
v. Collins, 78 F.3d 1021, 1030 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ 
U.S.___, 117 S. Ct. 189 (1996) (upholding Hobbs Act 
conviction of husband of Kentucky Governor charged with 
soliciting political contributions in exchange for right to 
contend for state contracts since "[payors] acted out of fear 
that without payments they could lose the opportunity to 
compete for government contracts on a level playingfield, 
an opportunity to which they were legally entitled."). In this 
case, involving solely private parties, and in the absence of 
an Any Willing Provider Law, Gary's had no such right to a 
level playing field. 
 
c. Evidence of Other Unlawful Objectives 
 
BCI also argues that even if U.S. Healthcare did not have 
the unlawful objective of obtaining property to which it had 
no lawful claim, it had three other unlawful objectives that 
convert the economic coercion at issue here into extortion.24 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
24. Since we conclude that each of these allegations of wrongful 
objectives lacks support, we need not decide whether proof that 
defendants' possessed one of these objectives would be sufficient to 
convert U.S. Healthcare's use of the fear of economic loss into extortion 
where U.S. Healthcare had a lawful right to the property obtained. 
 
                                56 
  
They are (1) violation of Pennsylvania's insurance fraud 
statute; (2) violation of New Jersey's Any Willing Provider 
law; and (3) violation of U.S. Healthcare's own  internal 
procedures. Of these three objectives, the jury was only 
instructed as to BCI's theory that the defendants use of 
economic fear was wrongful because it had the unlawful 
objective of violating the Pennsylvania Insurance Fraud 
statute, and thus we address only that theory in the text.25 
The other two theories, on which the jury was not 
instructed, are rejected summarily in the margin.26 
 
The Pennsylvania insurance fraud statute provides that: 
 
       a health care provider may not compensate or give 
       anything of value to a person to recommend or secure 
       the provider's service to or employment by a patient or 
       as a reward for having made a recommendation 
       resulting in the provider's service to or employment by 
       a patient. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
25. The district court also instructed the jury that one such unlawful 
objective would be "a violation of the Federal antitrust laws." In light 
of 
the fact that we vacate the antitrust verdict, this instruction alone 
might 
compel us to vacate the jury finding with respect to extortion and, 
indeed, to the whole of the RICO count. However, since we find that both 
claims fall of their own weight, we need not rely on this flawed jury 
instruction as grounds for reversal, and thus do not address BCI's 
contention that U.S. Healthcare waived any objection to the instruction. 
 
26. BCI's claim that U.S. Healthcare had the unlawful objective of 
violating the New Jersey Any Willing Provider Law, see N.J.S. 
26:2J-4.7(a)(2), fails because BCI has RICO standing only to recover for 
the loss of its TPA contract with Gary's, all of whose pharmacies are 
located in Pennsylvania. 
 
BCI's argument that U.S. Healthcare had the unlawful objective of 
violating its own internal regulations is founded on BCI's assertion that 
U.S. Healthcare's internal regulations required it to admit into its 
network all pharmacies whose applications met U.S. Healthcare's 
admission criteria. BCI's brief, however, does not clearly specify the 
exact 
regulation(s) in which such a requirement is contained, and it is not at 
all clear that such regulations exist. At all events, BCI's claim must 
fail 
since, even if U.S. Healthcare's regulations did contain such a 
requirement, we see no reason why violation of an internal regulation 
regarding provider admission would be unlawful. 
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18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 4117(b)(2) (Purdon 1997). We 
disagree with BCI that the jury could reasonably have 
concluded that U.S. Healthcare's conduct violated this 
statute. By its terms the statute forbids providers from 
buying recommendations or referrals of patients, and is 
thus properly characterized as an "anti-kickback" statute 
directed at providers rather than insurers, such as HMOs. 
Even if we ignored the statute's clear focus, BCI's 
contention that U.S. Healthcare violated the statute by 
referring patients to pharmacies that agreed to give them a 
benefit fails for two reasons. First, the record does not 
support an inference that U.S. Healthcare recommended 
that its members patronize any particular pharmacy in the 
network. Second, health care providers generally give HMOs 
something of value (at least in the form of lower prices) in 
exchange for admission into a network. Thus, if the 
allegations in this case violated the statute, HMOs might be 
rendered illegal in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania General 
Assembly could not have so intended. 
 
2. Commercial Bribery 
 
The Pennsylvania commercial bribery statute states that 
a "person who holds himself out to the public as being in 
the business of making disinterested selection, appraisal, or 
criticism of commodities or services" violates the law "if he 
solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit to influence 
his selection, appraisal or criticism." 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. S 4108(b) (Purdon 1983). Thus, in order for the 
conduct in this case to constitute commercial bribery, BCI 
would have to prove (1) that U.S. Healthcare held itself out 
as being in the business of making disinterested selection, 
appraisal or criticism of health care providers; and (2) that 
it solicited, accepted, or agreed to accept a benefit to 
influence that selection, appraisal or criticism. 
 
BCI argues that the jury had sufficient evidence before it 
from which to conclude that the defendants held 
themselves out to the public as selecting providers 
disinterestedly, based solely on the quality of the provider. 
BCI points to the testimony of defendant Wolfson to the 
effect that U.S. Healthcare holds itself out as having quality 
assurance procedures, and to a snippet from 
U.S. Healthcare's annual report which boasts of 
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U.S. Healthcare's performance monitoring and quality 
assessment systems for the health care providers in its 
networks, and which states that the quality assessments 
systems "begin with the certification of providers before 
they can become eligible to care for our members." 
 
U.S. Healthcare responds convincingly that this evidence 
merely documents the reality that provider quality was a 
necessary, but not always sufficient, criterion for inclusion 
in its network. The "bottom line" is that U.S. Healthcare is 
not a disinterested appraiser of health care providers; it is 
an HMO. An HMO is designed to provide access to low-cost, 
good quality health care, at a profit for the HMO. Thus, 
while U.S. Healthcare is required by law to allow only 
qualified providers into its network,27  and chooses its 
providers from the set of qualified providers, it alone 
decides whom within that set to admit largely on the basis 
of a provider's willingness to furnish care at managed care 
rates. There is nothing disinterested about this process, 
and we find no evidence to support a finding that 
U.S. Healthcare represented to the public that the process 
was, in fact, disinterested. 
 
Finally, we note that the essence of BCI's claim is that 
U.S. Healthcare used its quality assurance machinery not 
just to assure quality, but also to coerce Gary's into giving 
CHA its TPA business. The commercial bribery statute, 
however, is not concerned with the motive underlying 
U.S. Healthcare's use of its quality assurance procedures, 
so long as U.S. Healthcare did not hold itself out as a 
disinterested appraiser of pharmacies. Thus, while evidence 
of such coercion provides fodder for BCI's tortious 
interference claim, see infra, it is misplaced in the context 
of an argument regarding the carefully circumscribed crime 
of commercial bribery. In sum, since BCI failed to produce 
evidence to support a finding that U.S. Healthcare held 
itself out as a disinterested appraiser of pharmacies, we 
must set aside the jury's finding that some of the 
defendants committed commercial bribery. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
27. See 28 Pa. Code. S 9.71 (1997). 
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3. Mail and Wire Fraud 
 
The federal mail and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. 
S 1341 and 18 U.S.C. S 1343, prohibit the use of the mails 
or interstate wires for the purpose of carrying out any 
scheme or artifice to defraud. See Kehr Packages, Inc. v. 
Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1413 (3d Cir. 1991). "A 
scheme or artifice to defraud need not be fraudulent on its 
face, but must involve some sort of fraudulent 
misrepresentations or omissions reasonably calculated to 
deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension." 
Id. at 1415 (internal quotations omitted). 
 
BCI contends that there was ample evidence for the jury 
reasonably to have found that the defendants engaged in a 
scheme to defraud Gary's concerning the nature and 
purpose of the quality assurance audit and freeze of the 
Eagleville store, and the reason for the refusal to process 
the Abington store application. BCI submits that, whereas 
the defendants led Gary's to believe that legitimate quality 
assurance concerns motivated their actions, 
U.S. Healthcare really intended to use the audit as a means 
to pressure Gary's into switching to CHA as its TPA. 
Assuming that BCI is correct regarding U.S. Healthcare's 
true motivation (and the record supports their view), the 
failure to disclose this motivation does not create a 
cognizable "scheme to defraud" in the absence of any 
evidence that this omission was "reasonably calculated to 
deceive" Gary's. 
 
Here, such a conclusion is not supported by the record 
evidence, which instead supports the conclusion that 
Gary's was well aware of the fact that the audits were 
motivated either by a desire to retaliate against it for 
canceling the contract with U.S. Healthcare and switching 
to a self-insurance program, or by a desire to encourage it 
to choose CHA as its TPA. Indeed, the thrust of plaintiff's 
case is that Gary's was so acutely aware of this fact that it 
felt that it had no choice but to switch TPA providers. 
Moreover, if U.S. Healthcare's intention was to use the 
audits as a means of coercing Gary's to switch TPA 
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providers, it would make little sense to conceal this 
underlying motivation from Gary's.28 
 
As was the case with BCI's commercial bribery claim, the 
evidence of defendants' heavy-handed business tactics and, 
specifically, of their misuse of the quality assurance 
machinery, while relevant to a tortious interference claim, 
cannot be made to fit within the statutory and doctrinal 
constraints of the mail and wire fraud statutes. 
 
4. The Travel Act 
 
To make out a violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. 
S 1952, BCI is required to prove interstate travel or use of 
an interstate facility with the intent to promote unlawful 
activity. See United States v. Zolicoffer, 869 F.2d 771, 774 
(3d Cir. 1989). "Unlawful activity" is "extortion, bribery, or 
arson in violation of the laws of the State in which 
committed or of the United States." 18 U.S.C.S 1952(b)(2). 
Thus, BCI's Travel Act claim hinges on the success of its 
Hobbs Act and commercial bribery claims. Since we have 
determined that the jury's findings of these predicate acts 





Having found that the BCI did not present a sustainable 
case that defendants committed any of the alleged predicate 
acts, we must set aside the verdict that defendants violated 
18 U.S.C. S 1962(c) and that they conspired to violate that 
section as prohibited by 18 U.S.C. S 1962(d).29 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
28. Further, to the extent that BCI contends that U.S. Healthcare's 
proffered justification for the audit -- Gary's excessive use of brand 
name drugs -- was an overt misrepresentation, we disagree. The record 
shows that Gary's employees conceded that the stated reason was 
accurate, and that the audit revealed that Gary's was using generic 
drugs far less than the network average and inadequately documenting 
decisions not to use them. Our conclusion does not diminish BCI's claim 
that the audit was intended to coerce Gary's choice of TPA providers 
since even a "legitimate" audit may, based on timing and other 
circumstances, have a coercive purpose and effect. 
 
29. Defendants have also argued that the aiding and abetting liability 
imposed on the three U.S. Healthcare executives cannot survive because 
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V. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE 
 
In addition to finding for BCI on its federal law claims, 
the jury also awarded BCI damages on the theory that 
defendants unlawfully and improperly interfered with BCI's 
existing and prospective contractual relations with Gary's. 
Defendants challenge this verdict on the ground that, as 
competitors for Gary's TPA business, they had a privilege to 
interfere with BCI's terminable at will contract with Gary's 
so long as they did not employ "wrongful means". See 
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 768(1)(b) (1979). 
Defendants contend that BCI made no legally sufficient 
showing of wrongfulness, and thus that the "competitors' 
privilege" compels entry of judgment in their favor on BCI's 
tortious interference claim. In the alternative, defendants 
argue that even if BCI presented a jury question on tortious 
interference, a new trial is required because of an error in 
the jury charge. 
 
Pennsylvania recognizes both interference with existing 
contractual relations and interference with prospective 
contractual relations as branches of the tort of interference 
with contract. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of 
Greater Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914, 925 (3d Cir. 1990). 
While the two branches of tortious interference are distinct, 
they share essentially the same elements. In order to 
prevail on a claim for intentional interference with 
contractual or prospective contractual relations, a plaintiff 
must prove: 
 
       (1) the existence of a contractual, or prospective 
       contractual relation between itself and a third party; 
 
       (2) purposeful action on the part of the defendant, 
       specifically intended to harm the existing relation, or to 
       prevent the prospective relation from occurring; 
 
       (3) The absence of a privilege or justification on the 
       part of the defendant; 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the statutory analysis applied to securities cases by the Supreme Court 
in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 
511 U.S. 164 (1994), if applied to the RICO statute, would eliminate 
RICO aiding and abetting liability. In view of the dismissal of the RICO 
claims, that argument need not be reached. 
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       (4) the occasioning of actual legal damage as a re sult 
       of the defendants' conduct; and 
 
       (5) for prospective contracts, a reasonable likeli hood 
       that the relationship would have occurred but for the 
       interference of the defendant 
 
Pelagatti v. Cohen, 536 A.2d 1337, 1343 (Pa. Super. 1988); 
see also Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co., 412 A.2d 466, 
471 (Pa. 1979); Birl v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 167 A.2d 472, 
474 (Pa. 1960). 
 
The defendants assert that BCI failed to present sufficient 
evidence to satisfy the third element of its claim, which is 
the absence of privilege or justification on the part of the 
defendants. In support of this contention the defendants 
direct us to S 768 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
which sets forth the competitors' privilege. That section 
provides: 
 
S 768. Competition as Proper or Improper Interference. 
 
       (1) One who intentionally causes a third person no t to 
       enter into a prospective contractual relation with 
       another who is his competitor or not to continue an 
       existing contract terminable at will does not interfere 
       improperly with the other's relation if 
 
       (a) the relation concerns a matter involved in the 
       competition between the actor and the other and 
 
       (b) the actor does not employ wrongful means and 
 
       (c) his action does not create or continue an unla wful 
       restraint of trade and 
 
       (d) his purpose is at least in part to advance his 
       interest in competing with the other. 
 
       (2) The fact that one is a competitor of another f or the 
       business of a third person does not prevent his causing 
       a breach of an existing contract with the other from 
       being an improper interference if the contract is not 
       terminable at will. 
 
Section 768 has been recognized by Pennsylvania courts, 
see Gilbert v. Otterson, 550 A.2d 550, 554 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1988); Franklin Music Co. v. American Broadcasting Co., 
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616 F.2d 528, 543-44 (3d Cir. 1980), which are guided by 
the Restatement of Torts in the area of tortious 
interference, see Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoff v. 
Epstein, 393 A.2d 1175 (Pa. 1978). 
 
As a threshold matter, the parties dispute whether BCI's 
contract with Gary's was prospective or existing, and thus 
whether defendants can even seek the protection of S 768. 
BCI contends that, since it had an existing contract with 
Gary's at the time of defendants' alleged interference, 
defendants' status as competitors could not make the 
interference proper. See S 768(2). In response, defendants 
argue that BCI's contract with Gary's was terminable at 
will, and thus that the Restatement would characterize it as 
prospective, see Restatement (Second) of Torts S 766 cmt. g. 
("an interference with [a contract terminable at will] is 
closely analogous to interference with prospective 
contractual relations."), thereby bringing defendants' 
behavior within the ambit of S 768(1). While the proper 
classification of at will contracts in tortious interference 
case law has been the subject of some controversy, we need 
not enter this debate here since S 768(1), by its terms, 
applies to alleged interference with either prospective 
contractual relations or existing contracts terminable at 
will. There is no question that BCI's contract with Gary's 
was terminable at will.30 
 
Turning to the four elements set forth in S 768(1), the 
parties do not contest that elements (a) and (d) are 
satisfied. BCI and CHA were competitors for Gary's TPA 
contract, and defendants had the purpose, at least in part, 
of advancing their interests through their competition with 
BCI. We also conclude that to the extent that BCI is 
arguing that defendants' conduct constituted an unlawful 
restraint of trade within the meaning of S 768(1)(c), this 
contention is foreclosed by our reversal of BCI's antitrust 
claim and BCI's failure to show how defendants conduct 
violated any other federal or state statutory or common law 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
30. BCI's contract with Gary's provided that"[e]ither party may terminate 
this Agreement for any reason or no reason at any time upon thirty (30) 
days written notice." This language clearly marks the contract as 
terminable at will upon proper notice. 
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anti-competitive prohibition. Thus, the question is whether 
defendants' actions were privileged business competition, 
which turns on whether they employed "wrongful means" of 
inducement in their efforts to secure Gary's TPA contract. 
See S 768(1)(b). 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has yet to provide a 
definition of "wrongful means", and thus we turn to the 
Restatement for guidance. In defining what kind of means 
are wrongful, comment e to S 768 provides, in part, that: 
 
       If the actor employs wrongful means, he is not justified 
       under the rule stated in this Section. The predatory 
       means discussed in S 767, Comment c, physical 
       violence, fraud, civil suits and criminal prosecutions, 
       are all wrongful in the situation covered by this 
       Section. 
 
Other courts, relying partly on this language, have 
interpreted the wrongful means element of S 768 to require 
independently actionable conduct on the part of the 
defendant. See, e.g. DP-Tek, Inc. v. AT&T Global Information 
Solutions Co., 100 F.3d 828, 833-35 (10th Cir. 1997). 
Under this standard, wrongful means are those that are 
themselves capable of forming the basis of liability for the 
defendant. Id. at 834 (citing Amerinet, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 
972 F.2d 1483 (8th Cir. 1992)). The defendants contend 
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would adopt this 
construction of wrongful means, and that we must 
therefore set aside the tortious interference verdict as a 
matter of law since BCI has failed to identify any basis on 
which the defendants' conduct could be independently 
actionable other than the antitrust and RICO theories 
which we have found to be legally untenable. 
 
The disposition of BCI's claim, however, does not require 
us to determine whether Pennsylvania would limit wrongful 
means to those that are independently actionable because 
the allegations of wrongful means in this case differ in one 
crucial aspect from those in cases such as DP-Tek. Whereas 
in DP-Tek the defendant was accused of using wrongful 
means in the market in which it and the plaintiff competed, 
here BCI has alleged that the defendants employed 
economic pressure in what we have deemed the market for 
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pharmacy customers (where BCI was not a competitor) in 
order to force Gary's hand in the TPA market (where BCI 
and CHA competed). This form of "competition" is 
specifically deemed wrongful by the portion of comment e 
which directly follows that quoted above. It reads: 
 
       The rule stated in this Section rests on the belief that 
       competition is a necessary or desirable incident of free 
       enterprise. Superiority of power in the matters relating 
       to competition is believed to flow from superiority in 
       efficiency and service. If the actor succeeds in diverting 
       business from his competitor by virtue of superiority in 
       matters relating to their competition, he serves the 
       purposes for which competition is encouraged. If, 
       however, he diverts the competitor's business by 
       exerting a superior power in affairs unrelated to their 
       competition there is no reason to suppose that his 
       success is either due to or will result in superior 
       efficiency or service and thus promote the interest that 
       is the reason for encouraging competition. For this 
       reason economic pressure on the third person in matters 
       unrelated to the business in which the actor and the 
       other compete is treated as an improper interference. 
 
S 768, cmt. e. (emphasis added) 
 
Based on the this section of comment e, we believe that 
even if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court were to require 
independently actionable means, it would not apply that 
requirement in cases, such as this one, where the 
defendant exerted "economic pressure" or "a superior 
power" in a market unrelated to the competitive market. Cf. 
DP-Tek, 100 F.2d at 835 n.8 (citing comment e and noting 
that an exception to the independently actionable conduct 
requirement may exist "where a plaintiff proffers evidence 
that the defendant exerted `a superior power in affairs 
unrelated' to the business in which they compete."). The 
defendants contend that Pennsylvania, while it has adopted 
S 768, would ignore this portion of comment e. We disagree, 
since we see no reason why Pennsylvania would subscribe 
to the requirements of S 768, but only to selective portions 
of the comments explaining that section. 
 
BCI proffered ample evidence from which a jury could 
conclude that U.S. Healthcare attempted to acquire Gary's 
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TPA business by threatening Gary's with withdrawal of its 
membership in the U.S. Healthcare provider network. BCI 
also adduced evidence of heavy-handed tactics by 
U.S. Healthcare in the market for pharmacy customers. As 
was discussed in the RICO section, a reasonable jury could 
have found that U.S. Healthcare used its quality assurance 
machinery not only to assure quality, but also to generate 
economic pressure on Gary's to switch TPA providers. While 
we found that this coercive misuse of the quality assurance 
apparatus was not cognizable as commercial bribery or 
mail/wire fraud, see supra, it is sufficient, based on 
comment e, to constitute wrongful means under 
Pennsylvania tortious interference law. 
 
Defendants seek to avoid the clear application of 
comment e to their actions by arguing that since both 
comment e and federal tying/coercive reciprocal dealing 
jurisprudence are concerned with the extension of economic 
power from one market to another, the two bodies of law 
should be read in tandem, and thus that BCI's failure to 
show that the defendants possessed sufficient market 
power to violate the Sherman Act should preclude BCI, as 
a matter of law, from recovering on its tortious interference 
claim. Put differently, defendants assert that they could not 
apply "economic pressure" on Gary's in the market for 
pharmaceutical customers since they did not have 
appreciable market power, under federal law, in that 
market. We disagree both with the defendants' reading of 
comment e and with the premise that state tortious 
interference law and federal antitrust law should be read in 
pari materia. 
 
Defendants' argument that the federal market power 
requirement must be grafted onto comment e is predicated 
on their suggestion that without such a requirement, 
comment e would render all reciprocal dealing/tying 
arrangements tortious -- even those that are pro- 
competitive. (Our reference to pro-competitive tying 
arrangements is to those that do not violate the Sherman 
Act.) Defendants submit that such a result would be 
contrary to the public policy of Pennsylvania as evidenced 
by the Commonwealth's failure to pass an Any Willing 
Provider law. According to the defendants, this failure 
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indicates that Pennsylvania favors selective contracting 
between HMOs and providers, and thereby approves of the 
conduct at issue here. 
 
We decline to read an affirmative policy statement into a 
legislature's failure to pass a law; to do so would be wholly 
speculative. But even if defendants are correct that 
Pennsylvania has a policy of allowing HMOs to decide 
whom to admit into their networks, it would stretch this 
policy beyond its logical constraints to find in it tacit 
approval of the use of threatened exclusion from a 
pharmacy network to foreclose competition on the merits in 
an unrelated market. 
 
Furthermore, we do not agree with defendants' reading of 
comment e. Rather, we read the language requiring the 
plaintiff to show that the defendant employed "economic 
pressure" and "a superior power" in the unrelated market 
as requiring evidence that the defendant used its economic 
power in that market to coerce the third party's decision in 
the competitive market. In order to show coercive pressure, 
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant exercised some 
market power in the unrelated market -- lest the third 
party simply ignore its demands. However, we see no 
reason why economic coercion cannot be generated by 
market power that, while not sufficient to violate the 




31. We reject defendants' argument that they are entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law since the only direct evidence that Gary's was coerced 
consists of hearsay testimony from three BCI employees to whom Gary's 
Robin Risler indicated that she was forced to fire BCI, and testimony 
from Sandra Chen that Gary Wolf had indicated to her that he was 
under pressure to entertain a bid for U.S. Healthcare's TPA service. The 
district court properly admitted these statements pursuant to Fed. R. 
Evid. 803(3), the "state of mind" exception to the hearsay rule, with the 
limiting instruction that the jury should not view the testimony as proof 
of the truth of the underlying facts asserted. Defendants contend that 
despite this instruction, the jury must have improperly used the 
testimony as substantive evidence of coercion, because there was no 
other evidence of coercion. We disagree with this conclusion and with 
the defendants' view of the evidence, since we believe that there is ample 
circumstantial evidence from which a jury could have reasonably inferred 
that Gary's was coerced. Defendants are, of course, free to argue their 
view of the evidence on remand. 
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Viewing the preceding discussion in a broader context, 
defendants' contention that comment e should be read to 
include a federal market power requirement ignores the 
different purposes and scopes of inquiry of the two bodies 
of law. In particular, it fails to recognize both the 
gatekeeping role that the market power requirement plays 
in federal tying jurisprudence and the quite different 
policies of state tort law. Federal antitrust law is directed at 
protecting competition rather than individual competitors, 
and outlaws only those tying/reciprocal dealing 
arrangements that substantially foreclose competition in 
the tied product market. The market power requirement of 
the per se antitrust jurisprudence serves this goal since it 
is presumed that where the defendant exercises appreciable 
market power in the tying product market it can leverage 
that power to substantially foreclose competition in the tied 
product market. 
 
The use of the federal market power screen is, however, 
inapposite to state tortious interference law which does not 
predicate liability on a showing that the defendant's 
conduct had broad anti-competitive effects. Unlike federal 
antitrust law, state tortious interference law is designed to 
protect competitors not competition. In this regard, it bases 
liability for competitors, in part, on the means of 
competition employed and their effect on a single 
competitive interaction. This inquiry neither requires, nor is 
served by, a showing that the defendant exercised 
appreciable market power. 
 
In the end, we take a fundamentally different view of 
BCI's tortious interference claim from that espoused by the 
defendants. As we noted earlier in this opinion, the crux of 
defendants' argument is that BCI should not be able to 
repackage a failed antitrust claim as tortious interference. 
In our view, BCI has attempted just the opposite. That is, 
it has taken conduct that constituted tortious interference 
with contractual relations and attempted to turn it into 
violations of federal antitrust and racketeering laws. While 
these attempts have been derailed on this appeal, that 
result does not foreclose BCI's state tort law claim. 
 
Despite our determination that BCI adduced sufficient 
evidence at trial to allow a reasonable jury tofind that 
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defendants employed wrongful means and thus acted 
outside the scope of the competitors' privilege, we must 
reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial 
because of errors in the relevant jury charge. The district 
court instructed the jury on "wrongful means" as follows: 
 
       It is -- wrongful means to take business away from a 
       competitor by using economic power in matters that 
       are unrelated to the business in which the competitors 
       compete. Thus taking away a competitor's business by 
       applying economic pressure in an area that is 
       unrelated to the field in which the parties compete 
       constitutes wrongful means. 
 
       Wrongful means also include any unlawful conduct in 
       violation of specific statutory provisions or of 
       established public policy. 
 
       To determine whether a defendant's interference was 
       wrongful, you should consider the following factors: 
       first, the nature of the actor's conduct; second, the 
       actor's motive; third, the interests of the other with 
       which the actor's conduct interferes; fourth, the 
       interests sought to be advanced by the actor; fifth, the 
       social interests in protecting the freedom of action of 
       the actor and the contractual interests of the other; 
       sixth, the proximity or remoteness of the actor's 
       conduct to the interference and, seventh, the relations 
       between the parties. 
 
As set out in the proceeding discussion, the first 
paragraph of this instruction, which is derived from 
comment e to S 768, provides a proper basis on which the 
jury could have determined that the defendants' conduct 
was wrongful. However, the second paragraph, while an 
accurate statement of the law, necessitates a retrial 
because it invited the jury to import the errors in the 
antitrust and RICO analysis, as set out supra, into the 
tortious interference analysis. Indeed, based on the 
prominent position that BCI's antitrust claim occupied at 
trial, such infection almost certainly occurred. Faced with 
this circumstance, the proper course is for us to remand for 
a new trial rather than attempt to divine the basis of the 
jury's verdict. See Wilburn v. Maritrans GP, Inc., ___ F.3d 
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___, 1998 WL 100551, *9 (3d Cir. Mar. 10, 1998) ("Where a 
jury has returned a general verdict and one theory of 
liability is not sustained by the evidence or legally sound, 
the verdict cannot stand because the court cannot 
determine whether the jury based its verdict on an 
improper ground."); Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 646 (3d 
Cir. 1980) (" `Where . . . a general verdict may rest on either 
of two claims -- one supported by the evidence and the 
other not -- a judgment thereon must be reversed.' ") 
(quoting Albergo v. Reading Co., 372 F.2d 83, 86 (3d Cir. 
1967)); see also McKenna v. Pacific Rail Service, 32 F.3d 
820, 831-32 (3d Cir. 1994).32 
 
BCI argues that remand is not required since defendants' 
waived any objection to the jury charge. Their argument 
has two bases. The first is Fed. R. Civ. P. 51 which requires 
any objections to the jury charge to be made at the close of 
the charge. As BCI correctly notes, no such objection was 
lodged in this case. Despite this failure, we do notfind 
waiver since we see no basis on which defendants could 
have objected to this portion of the instruction. As noted, 
the problem with the court's instruction was not that it 
misstated the law, but rather that, in correctly stating the 
law, it created the possibility that errors in the RICO and 
antitrust verdicts would contaminate the tortious 
interference verdict. Thus, it was not until our decision on 
appeal that the tortious interference instructions became 
erroneous. In such a situation, it would be unfair to visit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
32. We do not believe that any doubt is cast on the applicability of this 
general rule by the fact that this case was submitted to the jury on 
special interrogatories and thus, unlike the cases cited, the jury did not 
render a general verdict. Our reading of the verdict sheet submitted to 
the jury in this case indicates that, at least as to the tortious 
interference count, the verdict rendered by the jury was the functional 
equivalent of a general verdict. The sole question relating to tortious 
interference liability posed to the jury was 
 
       Do you find that the plaintiff has proven by a preponderance of the 
       evidence that the following defendants intentionally interfered 
with 
       the plaintiff's existing or prospective contractual relations. 
 
As this interrogatory in no way facilitates our inquiry into the basis for 
the jury verdict, we find that the general rule requiring remand stated in 
Wilburn and Avins governs. 
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the harsh consequence of waiver on the defendants. This 
conclusion is buttressed by the fact that defendants did 
object at trial to the jury instructions regarding the alleged 
antitrust violation. 
 
BCI also contends that since the case was submitted to 
the jury on special interrogatories, defendants' failure to 
proffer any interrogatories requiring the jury to specify the 
basis on which they found defendants conduct to be 
wrongful resulted in a waiver by defendants of any right 
they had to a new trial on that basis. This contention is 
based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a), which governs the use of 
special verdicts in the federal courts. Specifically, plaintiff 
relies on that part of Rule 49(a) which provides that if, 
when submitting special interrogatories to the jury, "the 
court omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by 
the evidence, each party waives the right to a trial by jury 
of the issue so omitted unless before the jury retires he 
demands its submission to the jury." Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a).33 
 
While, under Rule 49(a), a court may be deemed to have 
made a factual finding on an element of an offense that is 
necessary to sustain a judgment even though the jury did 
not specifically answer an interrogatory concerning that 
element, see Watkins v. Fibreboard Corp., 994 F.2d 253, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
33. Rule 49(a) provides: 
 
       (a) Special Verdicts. The court may require a jury  to return only 
a 
       special verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each 
       issue of fact. In that event the court may submit to the jury 
written 
       questions susceptible of categorical or other brief answer or may 
       submit written forms of the several special findings which might 
       properly be made under the pleadings and evidence; or it may use 
       such other method of submitting the issues and requiring the 
       written findings thereon as it deems most appropriate. The court 
       shall give to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning 
       the matter thus submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury 
       to make its findings upon each issue. If in so doing the court 
omits 
       any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by the evidence, each 
       party waives the right to a trial by jury of the issue so omitted 
       unless before the jury retires the party demands its submission to 
       the jury. As to an issue omitted without such demand the court may 
       make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to 
have 
       made a finding in accord with the judgment on the special verdict. 
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257-58 (5th Cir. 1993), we do not read this rule, by its 
terms, as applying to the situation where, as here, the 
defendants' objection is not based on the fact that the 
wrongfulness issue was not submitted to the jury, but 
rather that the court gave a definition of wrongful that has 
been rendered erroneous by our decision on this appeal. 
 
Nor would such an application be in keeping with the 
purpose of that section of Rule 49(a) that allows the trial 
court to "fill in the gaps" of a special verdict. As noted in 
Watkins, this ability 
 
       is imperative if a special verdict . . . rather than a 
       general verdict is to continue to be employed. 
       Otherwise there would always be the danger that the 
       special verdict would be set aside because the jury had 
       failed to make a particular finding whereas a general 
       verdict could not be challenged on this ground. 
 
994 F.2d at 258 (citing 5A Moore's Federal Practice 
P 49.03(4) (1993); 9a Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure S 2507 (1971)). In this case, 
even had the jury rendered a general verdict, we would be 
constrained to remand for a new trial based on errors in 
the charge. Thus, the need to preserve symmetry between 
the treatment of general and special verdicts would not be 
served, and would indeed be denigrated, by a finding of 




For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 
court will be reversed and the case remanded with 
instructions to grant judgment for the defendants' on BCI's 
antitrust and civil RICO claim, and to conduct a new trial 




34. On retrial, the jury will have to consider anew whether defendants' 
behavior was outrageous enough to warrant an award of punitive 
damages under Pennsylvania law. See Takes v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 
655 A.2d 138, 146 (Pa. Super. 1995) ("[P]unitive damages will lie only in 
cases of outrageous behavior, where defendant's egregious conduct 
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The parties shall bear their own costs. 
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Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 




shows either an evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of 
others.") While the original jury found malice on the part of 
U.S. Healthcare and its executives, such a finding may not be inevitable 
at retrial where the jury will not be under the mistaken impression that 
defendants' conduct violated the Sherman Act, civil RICO, and the 
statutes underlying the predicate acts of the RICO count. We, of course, 
intimate no view on that subject.                                 
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